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In Defense of Liberal Education
Cass R. Sunstein
In my law school classes in my first year, the shortest measurement of time was the
interval between the teacher's asking another student a question and my hand going in
the air-just in case the student called on was not ready with an answer. At the end of
that first year, in an act of retaliatory affection, the class placed a caption under my
picture in the yearbook that read: "Derrick Bell. He knows everything and he wants
everybody to know that he knows everything."
I wonder what my classmates would say about Cass Sunsteins steady stream of
impressive publications over the last several years, publications covering every aspect of
the law and, to his great credit, perusing with seriousness and respect the new and
controversialforms of legal scholarship as they appeared. We have asked him here today
to share what he obviously has learned: that recognition of the new does not demand
belief that belief in the traditional need not deter examination of the new.
- Derrick A. Bell
Let me begin with my conclusions. We should reject the traditionalist
defense of traditional canons, in law and elsewhere. We should also reject
what I will be calling the postmodern attack on canonicity, of which parts of
Stanley Fish's essay seem to me a possible example. The two positions appear
sharply opposed, but actually they have a lot in common. They share the view
that if we do not have transcendental or external grounding for our judg-
ments, many things go out the window, including (for example) freedom, and
reason, and respect for authoritative texts. I'm going to make instead an old-
style liberal case for a form of multiculturalism and for revisiting the legal
canon-and just to the extent that these steps help educate our students
better, and help make them better lawyers and citizens.
Now for some details.
When I first read Stanley Fish's essay, I had a sudden association with a very
striking part of Robert H. Bork's The Tempting ofAmerica-Bork's treatment of
Brown v. Board of Education. Bork is of course an originalist, and of course he
knows that the framers" of the Fourteenth Amendment did not specifically
intend the federal courts to eliminate segregation. On Bork's own method,
Brown seems pretty easy-and wrong. But Bork did not reach this conclusion.
Instead he struggled mightily to explain why Brown was right after all.
What is interesting for present purposes is not the details of Bork's argu-
ment, but the fact that Bork found it necessary to make it. From this and other
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examples, it seems clear that to have a claim on lawyers' attention, any serious
theory of constitutional interpretation must be able to explain why Brown was
right. In this sense, Brown is part of the canon of constitutional law. It operates
just like The Merchant of Venice in Fish's account of the Skokie case.
Now what are we to make of this state of affairs? We could understand this
situation in two very different ways.
First: Lawyers have lost sight of the fact that Brown was very much a human
creation, very controversial (to say the least) in its time. Bizarrely, they take
this very human outcome as an absolutely fixed point for an analysis, when
they should understand it as a contingent product of distinctive social forces.
Lawyers have really committed an act of idolatry. As part of the legal canon,
Brown stops thought. Our principal interests should instead be in genealogy-
in how things got to be this way. What gave Brown its special status?
Now here is a second, very different response to what has happened with
Judge Bork and Brown:
Lawyers take Brown as correct for good reasons. Lawyers think that a
constitutional order that allowed apartheid would not be worthy of respect.
Lawyers think that any system of constitutional interpretation must ensure
that our constitutional order is worthy of respect. They have reasons for their
conclusion; these reasons have to do with the purposes and effects of racial
caste systems for the people subject to those systems.
I am an outsider to the literary and historical debate over the canon, and
what I am about to say may be inadequately informed; but in that debate, it
seems to me, many people accept some version of response one. They empha-
size that the canon is socially constructed, is a product of social forces, and
could have been otherwise. They believe that these claims make it hard or
impossible to offer response two, which suggests that there are good reasons
for giving special status to some texts, for claiming them as authorities. In any
case I think that this is what has happened in Stanley Fish's paper.
I also think that all this is a mistake.2 The mistake takes the following form.
If we do not have wholly external or transcendent foundations for some-
thing-if all we have is produced through human filters-we really have
nothing at all. If the self is a social artifact, or a social product, freedom itself is
in big trouble. Our beloved belief in liberty is an illusion simply because
mental powers are shaped and constrained by external influence; free speech
is an illusion too. Thus if antifoundationalism is right-if it was just us who
created the canon-maybe The Merchant of Venice is regulable under the First
Amendment. If Shakespeare is a social construct, maybe his works will have to
be demoted, maybe by a lot, and-now notjust maybe; now I'm speaking of a
real event-in literature departments some teachers will refuse to teach
Shakespeare's plays because of the author's reactionary politics. If the canon
is produced by us-if it is an outcome of social forces-then we might switch
things around very radically.
2. Relevant discussion can be found in Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge,
Mass., 1992), and in Martha C. Nussbaum, Sophistry About Conventions, in Love's Knowl-
edge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature 220 (New York, 1990).
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What-it might be asked-shall we consult when we do this? Perhaps
something called "politics"; perhaps "interest"; perhaps nothing at all.
I have said that there is a mistake here. Now let me explain why. From the
absence of external or transcendental foundations, it does not follow that
everything is up for grabs, or that all we have is conventions, or power, or play.
(I refer here, respectively, to Fish, Foucault, and Derrida.) It is right to say that
there is no wholly external perspective on human endeavors, that canoniza-
tion cannot be grounded without language or culture. But this does not mean
that good reasons cannot be offered on behalf of one view rather than
another. The alleged choice-between transcendental foundations on the
one hand and power, conventions, or play on the other-is entirely unneces-
sary. Instead we need to think about what sorts of approaches will serve what
sorts of things we, in our diversity and our commonality, really value. We do
not.need transcendental foundations to say that a regime of free speech is a lot
different from a regime of tyranny. The fact that people are influenced in
what they have to say does not in the least impugn freedom, or free speech, or
liberalism.
All this has been pretty abstract. Now let me turn to the canon. Some
people-I am calling them traditionalists-seem to think that the existing
canon in law and elsewhere has a very special claim on us. On their view, any
proposal for change or revision reflects a kind of cheap faddishness, disre-
spect for real quality, or hubris. On the traditionalist view, we really should
take our canon as given rather than chosen. If we do not, we will be giving in to
a kind of strident, standardless relativism in which political interest, rather
than reason, governs intellectual life.
Another group, represented by some postmodernists, thinks that canons in
general reflect the interests of certain groups-whites, or males, or hetero-
sexuals, or Europeans-and that a recognition of this fact will point the way to
a form of plurality that better serves socially diverse interests. So far, very
plausibly, so good. But for some people who hold this sort of view, any form of
ranking or valuation orjudgment-the view, for example, that Shakespeare is
especially good, worthier than most other writers-is perniciously hierarchi-
cal, or disabled in some way by virtue of the fact that it comes from human
beings. There are no common standards-only diverse interests, power, and
conventions.
Both of these positions seem to me to contain important truths. The
traditionalists are right to emphasize that much of what is in the existing
canon really does belong there. It doesn't matter much whether Kant and
Milton got into the canon partly for some bad reasons; they belong. At the
same time, there are undoubted biases in existing canons, and we should be
alert to this fact. But these important truths notwithstanding, I think that both
traditionalism and postmodernism are unhelpful to our question today. They
are each other's flip sides; they reflect the same kind of belief in the necessity
for wholly external foundations. Traditionalists disregard the fact that there is
no sufficient reason to think that any existing canon adequately serves educa-
tional goals. If what we want is good learning, and a good appreciation of what
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intellectual life has to offer, we should say that the virtues of wisdom, clarity,
and good argumentation are not limited to particular periods, genders, races,
and countries. And this fact means that some current canons are in for
revisiting.
But the postmodern position is little better.3 At least in some forms, that
position makes itvery hard to explain why we should engage in intellectual life
at all; if political power and political interest are all that is at stake, discussion
of texts is hardly a good path to follow. Moreover, what underlies some of the
most plausible claims of those who attack the current canon is the belief that
the canon should include works of certain kinds. This belief-this use of
"should"--makes sense only to the extent that it is based on generally accept-
able reasoxis, not on political interest.
Against both traditionalism and postmodernism, I suggest that we oppose a
third alternative, which might well be called a version of the old commitment
to liberal education. I won't be able to say a lot about that commitment now,
but at a minimum the commitment requires us to try to impart deep and wide
understanding-to counteract ignorance, bias, and parochialism. Some of the
current efforts to revisit the canon, in literature and history, are admirably
well-suited to that goal. Those efforts have helped bring to the attention of
students and teachers materials that are excellent, or that tell us a great deal
about culture, politics, and history, and that were excluded only because of
ignorance or bias in the past. Of course the class of reasons for inclusion of
any particular text is not closed and unitary, but open and plural; and of
course we will disagree about what reasons count as good. This is a matter that
deserves a good deal of attention. In literature, for example, there are such
traditional (and admittedly ambiguous) virtues as depth of human under-
standing and creativity with language; and works that show otherwise ne-
glected aspects of human experience might well be included even if they are
not quite so distinctive on other counts.
Now some brief words on canonicity within law. For lawyers, there are at
least three different aspects to canonicity, which should be kept distinct: first,
there is the category of authoritative texts; second, there is the curriculum-
the courses that we teach; third, there is the choice of materials within each
course. And, in the legal context, there is a distinctive element. Law students
are being trained to be lawyers, and in order to be lawyers, there are certain
things that law students need to learn. This fact imposes a degree of constraint
on law school experimentation with the canon. What literature departments
do creates the canon; the same is less true, or at least it's differently true, of law
schools, who have courts and employers to answer to.
But within that fairly broad constraint it is important to expose students to
a diverse array of thought and information, so as to equip them to be better
lawyers and citizens. American legal education is extremely parochial. Often it
seems as if the decisions of high-level American courts between 1970 and the
3. I draw in this and the following paragraph from the valuable discussion in Amy Gutmann,
Introduction, in Charles Taylor et al., Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition" 3
(Princeton, 1992).
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present exhaust the contours of appropriate legal argument. It would be very
good for legal education to be both more comparative and more historical.
Let me offer just two examples. In the sodomy case, Bowers v. Hardwick,4 both
the lawyers and the justices struggled hard to think about the history and
nature of homosexuality. In the abortion case, Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey,- the Supreme Court grappled with the causes and
consequences of laws restricting abortion. Part of the problem in both these
cases was simple ignorance. Compare, for example, the extraordinary histori-
cal and comparative material in Judge Posner's book Sex and Reason6 and in
Mary Ann Glendon's Abortion and Divorce in Western Law.' We can quarrel with
a lot in both books; but surely it is a huge advance to place, squarely within the
legal canon, some works that attend to the extraordinary diversity of attitudes
toward gender, reproduction; and sexual orientation. Surely it is important
for lawyers to know what Posner and Glendon have told us; this information
would have added an enormous amount to an understanding of the issues in
both Bowers and Casey.
Let me add some final notes. Any system of free speech would be unaccept-
able if it allowed government to censor The Merchant of Venice. The Skokie case
was a hard one, but in the end it was rightly decided; government should not
be allowed to stop a political protest without making a graver showing of harm
than was provided there. Judge Bork's instincts were entirely right: an ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation is unacceptable if it entails the incor-
rectness of Brown v. Board of Education.
Perhaps some of these conclusions are wrong. Certainly we should be
willing to discuss the reasons that might be offered on their behalf. A commit-
ment to liberal education entails a commitment to this process of reason-
giving. It understands this process to be one that requires both width and
depth: an exposure to an array of attitudes and perspectives; a respect for
clarity of argument; an understanding that education entails not reinforce-
ment of widely held convictions, but appreciation of actual and potential
criticism from internal and external sources. I think that something of this
general sort would be a good start toward reevaluation of canonicity in law.
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
6. Cambridge, Mass., 1992.
7. Cambridge, Mass., 1987.
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